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559 
WASHINGTON’S ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE ACT: AN 
ANACHRONISM IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 
Stephanie Curry 
Abstract: Today, electronic contracting is at the forefront of how consumers, 
governments, and businesses conduct their affairs. Over the last several decades, electronic 
contracting has taken on new forms that have raised doubts about contract formation and 
enforceability. In order to facilitate commerce, the federal government and forty-nine states 
have responded by passing legislation that gives broad legal recognition to electronic 
signatures. Washington State is currently the only state that has not updated its electronic 
signature statute to comport with modern technology and ways of doing business. As a result, 
Washington’s Electronic Authentication Act is likely preempted by federal law, and it 
presents an uncertain environment for electronic contracting. This Comment argues that 
Washington should join the overwhelming majority of states in adopting the Uniform 
Electronic Transactions Act to optimize its statutory framework for facilitating electronic 
contracting. 
INTRODUCTION 
Unique like a thumbprint, pen-and-paper signatures have historically 
been essential to creating binding legal documents and commercial 
transactions.1 Today, the forms that modern signatures take would be 
unrecognizable to our great-grandparents’ generation. The modern 
pledge may now be made by sending an email, clicking a button on a 
website, or using sophisticated asymmetric cryptography technology, 
among others.2 
Congress and state legislatures have tried to keep pace with this 
technology in order to create parity between electronic and pen-and-
paper signatures.3 Around the mid-1990s, states began adopting laws 
giving legal recognition to various forms of electronic signatures.4 States 
                                                     
1. JEREMIAH S. BUCKLEY ET AL., THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES § 1:2 (2012–13 ed.) (“A 
signature can represent many legally significant functions in connection with a document or 
transaction. A signature may be used to identify a person; to provide certainty as to the personal 
involvement of that person in the act of signing; and to associate that person with the content of a 
document.”). 
2. Id. § 1:2(D). 
3. See Robert A. Wittie & Jane K. Winn, Electronic Records and Signatures Under the Federal 
E-SIGN Legislation and the UETA, 56 BUS. LAW. 293, 294–97 (2000). 
4. Id. 
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like Utah5 and Washington6 only narrowly recognized “digital 
signatures” that followed specific security protocols to confirm a 
signer’s identity.7 Other states took a broader approach and gave legal 
recognition to any type of electronic signature.8 In response to this 
patchwork of state laws, the Uniform Law Commission issued a model 
state law in 1999, the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA),9 
which broadly recognized all kinds of electronic signatures.10 
Despite the promulgation of UETA, the federal government feared 
that states would be slow to adopt UETA, and it sought to speed the 
adoption of a uniform, nationwide law.11 In 2000, Congress passed the 
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (ESIGN),12 
which gives broad legal recognition to electronic signatures13 and 
governs all interstate and international electronic transactions.14 While 
ESIGN borrowed similar concepts and provisions from UETA, the two 
are not identical.15 For example, ESIGN adds heightened consumer 
consent requirements,16 but it lacks other guidelines found in UETA, 
such as provisions regarding attribution disputes.17 In light of these 
similarities and differences, Congress added a unique preemption 
provision to ESIGN: a state that enacts the official version of UETA is 
exempt from federal preemption under ESIGN; a state that enacts 
anything other than the official version of UETA is preempted to the 
extent that the law either conflicts with ESIGN or prefers certain 
technologies over others.18 
                                                     
5. Utah Digital Signature Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-101 to -504 (West Supp. 1998) 
(repealed 2006). Utah adopted the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act in 2000. See UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 46-4-101 to -503 (West 2004 & Supp. 2012). 
6. Washington Electronic Authentication Act, ch. 250, 1996 Wash. Sess. Laws 1190. 
7. BUCKLEY ET AL., supra note 1, § 2:4(A). 
8. Id. § 2:4(B) (citing to Florida Electronic Signature Act of 1996, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 282.70–
.75 (West 1996), renumbered as FL. STAT. ANN. §§ 668.001–.006 (West 2000)). 
9. UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT, 7A U.L.A. 225 (2002) [hereinafter UETA], available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/electronic%20transactions/ueta_final_99.pdf. 
10. See id. § 2(8) (defining “electronic signature”). 
11. Wittie & Winn, supra note 3, at 296. 
12. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (ESIGN), Pub. L. No. 106-229, 
114 Stat. 464 (2000) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001–06 (2006)). 
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001(a)(1), (2). 
14. Id. § 7001(a). 
15. See infra Part III.A. 
16. See id. 
17. Wittie & Winn, supra note 3, at 297. 
18. 15 U.S.C. § 7002(a). 
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To date, all states have enacted UETA except for Illinois, New York, 
and Washington.19 Washington’s law was originally drafted to give legal 
effect to digital signatures20—a subset of electronic signatures that uses 
specific, secure technology—and it has been amended only superficially 
to incorporate all types of electronic signatures.21 While Illinois22 and 
New York23 have laws that more closely mirror UETA and ESIGN 
respectively, Washington’s Electronic Authentication Act (WEAA) 
remains a relative outlier; this outlier status creates uncertainty as to 
whether the statute, if challenged, would survive a preemption analysis 
under ESIGN. Of particular concern to UETA advocates is that 
Washington State—home to such e-commerce pioneers as Amazon.com, 
Microsoft, and Expedia—trails behind all other states in its electronic 
signature laws.24 In light of these concerns, a bill was introduced in the 
Washington State legislature to adopt UETA in 2012, but it died in 
committee.25 As of this writing, no new legislation has been introduced 
on the matter. 
Part I of this Comment reviews the development of electronic 
signatures and early state responses to modern electronic signatures. Part 
II reviews UETA, its approach to giving legal recognition to electronic 
signatures, and early state adoption of the model law. Part III outlines 
the federal response to electronic signatures through ESIGN and the 
peculiar preemption provisions contained therein. Part IV describes 
Washington’s electronic signature statute, the Electronic Authentication 
Act, and recent legislative efforts to adopt UETA. Finally, Part V argues 
that Washington’s Electronic Authentication Act is preempted by 
ESIGN. Instead of operating under the current status quo, Washington 
should clarify the state of the law and facilitate electronic commerce by 
adopting UETA. 
                                                     
19. See Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/uniform-electronic-transactions-acts.aspx (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2013). 
20. Washington Electronic Authentication Act, ch. 250, 1996 Wash. Sess. Laws 1190. 
21. Act of May 13, 1999, ch. 287, 1999 Wash. Sess. Laws 1203. 
22. Electronic Commerce Security Act, 1998 Ill. Laws 4191 (codified as amended at 5 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 175/1-101 to 175/99-1 (West 2005)). 
23. N.Y. STATE TECH. LAW §§ 101–09 (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2012). 
24. See Hearing on S.B. 6069 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 
2012) [hereinafter Hearing on S.B. 6069] (statement of Ken Moyle, Director, Electronic Signature 
and Records Association), available at http://www.tvw.org/index.php?option=com_tvwplayer& 
eventID=2012011130#start=361&stop=1174. 
25. S.B. 6069, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/ 
billdocs/2011-12/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Bills/6069.pdf. 
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I.  THE RISE OF ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES INVITES A 
JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE 
Although electronic signatures have existed for many years, their use 
exploded with the rise of electronic contracting, creating new concerns 
about contract formation and enforcement.26 In response, states adopted 
varying laws to give legal recognition to e-signatures.27 Some of these 
laws favored “digital signatures,” a subset of electronic signatures that 
uses secure technology to verify the user’s identity and the integrity of 
the transaction.28 Other states took a more neutral approach and broadly 
recognized all types of electronic signatures.29 Still other states took an 
intermediate approach or simply did nothing at all.30 
A.  Electronic Signatures Take Many Different Forms and Their Use 
Has Proliferated in Recent Years 
Electronic signatures have existed for as long as the technology used 
to record them. As early as 1867, courts recognized a telegraphed 
signature to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.31 As new technologies were 
invented, courts followed by recognizing the legal validity of signatures 
communicated by telephone to an operator,32 via tape recordings of an 
oral agreement,33 and by facsimile.34 
                                                     
26. See infra Part I.A; see also BUCKLEY ET AL., supra note 1, §§ 1:2(A)–(C). 
27. See infra Part I.B; see also Wittie & Winn, supra note 3, at 294–96. 
28. BUCKLEY ET AL., supra note 1, § 2:4(A); Wittie & Winn, supra note 3, at 295–96. 
29. BUCKLEY ET AL., supra note 1, § 2:4(B); Wittie & Winn, supra note 3, at 295–96. 
30. Wittie & Winn, supra note 3, at 296. 
31. Trevor v. Wood, 36 N.Y. 307, 310 (1867); see also Howley v. Whipple, 48 N.H. 487, 488 
(1869) (“[I]t makes no difference whether that operator writes the offer or the acceptance . . . with a 
steel pen an inch long attached to an ordinary penholder, or whether his pen be a copper wire a 
thousand miles long. In either case the thought is communicated to the paper by the use of the finger 
resting upon the pen; nor does it make any difference that in one case common record ink is used, 
while in the other case a more subtle fluid, known as electricity, performs the same office.”). For a 
general account of the history of signatures, see generally CHRIS HAWKINS, A HISTORY OF 
SIGNATURES: FROM CAVE PAINTINGS TO ROBO-SIGNINGS (2011). For a history on the Statute of 
Frauds with regard to advances in technology, see Steven Domanowski, E-SIGN: Paperless 
Transactions in the New Millennium, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 619, 622–36 (2001). 
32. Selma Sav. Bank v. Webster Cnty. Bank, 206 S.W. 870, 874 (Ky. 1918) (holding that a 
contract is formed when telephone message is transmitted to telegraph operator). 
33. Ellis Canning Co. v. Bernstein, 348 F. Supp. 1212, 1228 (D. Colo. 1972) (holding that a tape 
recording of an oral agreement satisfies the statute of frauds). But see Swink & Co. v. Carroll 
McEntee & McGinley, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 393 (Ark. 1979) (holding that a tape recording may satisfy 
the writing requirement but not the signature requirement). 
34. Vazak Intl. Corp. v. Mast Indus., 535 N.E.2d 633 (N.Y. 1989); Hessenthaler v. Farzin, 564 
A.2d 990 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). 
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Today, the use of electronic signatures in commercial transactions has 
exploded with the advent of computer technology.35 With ever-
developing advances in hardware and software, the forms that an 
electronic signature can take are also constantly evolving.36 For example, 
in the early days of commercial computing, electronic data interchange 
(EDI) emerged as a means for communicating standardized forms such 
as purchase orders, invoices, and shipping notices between two 
businesses irrespective of the particular hardware or software 
implemented at either end of the transmission.37 EDI was particularly 
effective between businesses with an established trade relationship, as 
they could sign traditional paper agreements governing the exchange of 
electronic messages between themselves.38 
Another early form of computerized electronic signatures emerged in 
the 1970s: “digital signatures,” a kind of electronic signature that uses 
secure cryptographic technology known as public key infrastructure 
(PKI)39 to ensure authentication of sender identity, data integrity, and 
non-repudiation.40 Digital signatures do not look like traditional 
signatures and are better understood as a “signature by process to the 
document.”41 PKI technology today enables millions of consumers 
around the world to enter into online transactions, where, for example, a 
consumer logs on to a secure web site like eBay or Amazon to make a 
purchase.42 Although the underlying technology of digital signatures is 
beyond the scope of this Comment, it is important to understand that 
digital signatures—as opposed to electronic signatures generally—refer 
to technology that employs specific procedures and third-party entities to 
verify the authenticity of electronic communications.43 In other words, 
                                                     
35. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, E-STATS (May 10, 2012), http://www.census.gov/econ/estats/ 
2010/2010reportfinal.pdf (reporting on e-commerce in 2010). 
36. HAWKINS, supra note 31, at 50–52. 
37. Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, The Commercial Use of Electronic Data 
Interchange—A Report and Model Trading Partner Agreement, 45 BUS. LAW. 1645, 1649–51 (June 
1990). For a helpful description of EDI technology, see also R.J. Roberston, Jr., Electronic 
Commerce on the Internet and the Statute of Frauds, 49 S.C. L. REV. 787 (1998). 
38. Wittie & Winn, supra note 3, at 294. 
39. HAWKINS, supra note 31, at 52–54. 
40. Donnie L. Kidd, Jr. & William H. Daughtrey, Jr., Adapting Contract Law to Accommodate 
Electronic Contracts: Overview and Suggestions, 26 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L. J. 215, 256 
(2000). 
41. Id. at 258. 
42. OASIS PKI Member Section FAQ, OASIS PKI, http://www.oasis-pki.org/faq.html (last visited 
Apr. 14, 2013). 
43. Jane K. Winn, The Emperor’s New Clothes: The Shocking Truth About Digital Signatures 
and Internet Commerce, 37 IDAHO L. REV 353, 354 n.1 (2001). For a general overview of PKI 
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digital signature technology ensures that a party contracting online, such 
as Amazon.com or eBay, is who they say they are, but digital signatures 
alone do not evidence assent to create a contract.44 
While EDI and PKI technology are important examples, they do not 
constitute the universe of electronic signatures. An electronic signature 
could be as simple as “a digitized image of paper signatures, typed 
notations such as ‘/s/ John Smith,’” or even an email signature block.45 
As history shows, the possible forms that electronic signatures can take 
are limited only by the types of technologies that can record and transmit 
them.46 
B. State Legislatures Responded to the Rise of Electronic 
Transactions by Passing a Range of Electronic Signature Laws 
At common law, the form a signature takes is usually less important 
than the intent behind the signature to form a legally binding 
document.47 However, as business transactions began to move online, 
laws regarding fraud, contract formation, and breach of contract became 
less certain.48 Concerns about contract formation are particularly acute in 
online retail transactions where “the closest thing to a signature occurs 
                                                     
technology, see CARLISLE ADAMS & STEVE LLOYD, UNDERSTANDING PKI: CONCEPTS, 
STANDARDS, AND DEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS (2d ed. 2003). 
44. Winn, supra note 43, at 360–61 (“A major . . . problem lies in equating what asymmetric 
cryptography and [PKI] do in the online context with what a manual signature does in traditional 
contracting contexts. Traditional signatures play a surprisingly nuanced and complex role in 
traditional contracting practices that prove very difficult to map onto online security technology 
functions. Not all contracts require a signature to be enforceable, and not all signatures evidence a 
signer’s intent to enter into a binding legal relationship. To apply the term ‘signature’ to the 
processes performed using [PKI] is at best a metaphor and at worse [sic] simply misleading.”). 
45. INFO. SEC. COMM., SCI. & TECH. SECTION, AM. BAR ASS’N, DIGITAL SIGNATURE 
GUIDELINES 3 (1996). 
46. See supra notes 31–42 and accompanying text; cf. UETA, supra note 9, Prefatory Note 
(acknowledging the continued development of innovative technology to facilitate electronic 
transactions). 
47. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(37) (2011) (defining “signed” as “any symbol executed or 
adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate a writing”); see also id. cmt. (“This 
provision also makes it clear that, as the term ‘signed’ is used in the Uniform Commercial Code, a 
complete signature is not necessary. The symbol may be printed, stamped or written; it may be by 
initials or by thumbprint. . . . No catalog of possible situations can be complete and the court must 
use common sense and commercial experience in passing upon these matters. The question always 
is whether the symbol was executed or adopted by the party with present intention to [authenticate] 
the writing.”); Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, supra note 37, at 1690–91 (stating that 
any symbols or codes affixed to or contained in covered records are signatures and are sufficient to 
verify the origin of the record). 
48. Wittie & Winn, supra note 3, at 294. 
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when the customer clicks a button labeled ‘I agree,’ ‘purchase now,’ or 
‘buy now.’”49 Additionally, while fraudulent pen-and-paper signatures 
were rarely a problem in contract formation, the Internet raised new 
fears about how to determine the identity of a signature—was the signer 
the credit card holder or a hacker thousands of miles away?50 
In response, early attempts at state legislation focused on giving legal 
recognition to digital signatures, a subset of electronic signatures. For 
example, Utah became the first state in 1995 to pass a law regarding 
electronic signatures,51 and its stated goal was to both “facilitate 
commerce by means of computerized communications” and “minimize 
the incidence of forged digital signatures and enable the reliable 
authentication of computer-based information.”52 This Act, which has 
since been repealed,53 required the use of “digital signatures.”54 By these 
terms, an electronic signature in Utah would only be at parity with a 
physical signature if it followed relatively complex authentication 
requirements,55 a substantial step away from the common law rule that 
the form of a signature is relatively unimportant in the eyes of the law.56 
Several other states followed suit by passing legislation that also 
required technology-specific authentication procedures,57 including 
Minnesota,58 Mississippi,59 Missouri,60 New Mexico,61 and 
                                                     
49. Patricia Brumfield Fry, Introduction to the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act: Principles, 
Policies and Provisions, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 237, 256 (2001). 
50. Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Construction and Application of Electronic Signatures in Global 
and National Commerce Act, 29 A.L.R. FED. 2D 519, § 2 (2008) (“[W]hile an actual signature can 
be proven to be that of the signer, proof of identity of the signer, and proof as to what was signed, 
are not as clear where an electronic or digital signature or consent is involved.”). 
51. Wittie & Winn, supra note 3, at 294–95 (citing to UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-201 to -504 
(1998)). 
52. Utah Digital Signature Act, ch. 61, § 2, 1995 Utah Laws 284, 284 (codified as amended at 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-102 (West Supp. 1998) (repealed 2006)). 
53. Repeal of Utah Digital Signature Act, ch. 21, 2006 Utah Laws 139. 
54. UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-102 (West Supp. 1998) (repealed 2006). 
55. See BUCKLEY ET AL., supra note 1, § 2:4(A). 
56. See id. § 1:2(A). 
57. Wittie & Winn, supra note 3, at 295. 
58. Minnesota Electronic Authorization Act, ch. 178, 1997 Minn. Laws 1192 (codified as 
amended at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325K.001–.27 (West 2011)). 
59. Mississippi Digital Signature Act of 1997, ch. 329, 1997 Miss. Laws 141, (codified at MISS. 
CODE ANN. §§ 25-63-1 to -11 (West 1999) (repealed 2001)). 
60. Missouri Digital Signatures Act, ch. S.B. 680, 1998 Mo. Laws 1197 (codified at MO. ANN. 
STAT. §§ 28.600–.684 (West Supp. 2001) (repealed 2003)). 
61. New Mexico Electronic Authentication of Documents Act, ch. 11, 1996 N.M. Laws 115 
(codified as amended at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-15-1 to -16 (LexisNexis 2003)). 
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Washington.62 
Instead of following the Utah model, other states chose a “media-
neutral” model that did not give preference to digital signatures.63 Still 
other states authorized electronic communications only in very specific 
contexts, such as “certain types of citizen-government 
communications.”64 Finally, some states did nothing at all to pass 
electronic signature laws.65 By the late 1990s, the patchwork of state 
laws surrounding electronic signatures posed a hurdle to the increasingly 
rapid expansion of electronic contracting.66 
II.  UETA PROVIDES A FRAMEWORK TO CREATE UNIFORM 
ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE LAWS AMONG THE STATES 
Faced with a growing patchwork of state laws, the Uniform Law 
Commission (ULC)67 decided to issue a uniform law that would provide 
consistency to state legislation.68 The ULC issued this model law, titled 
the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA), in July 1999.69 By 
May 2002, forty-one states and the District of Columbia had enacted it, 
and it was under consideration in seven more.70 As of the time of this 
                                                     
62. Washington Electronic Authentication Act, ch. 250, 1996 Wash. Sess. Laws 1190 (codified as 
amended at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.34.010–.410 (2012)). 
63. Wittie & Winn, supra note 3, at 295 n.12 (citing Oklahoma Electronic Records and 
Signatures Act of 1998 (codified as amended at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 960–68 (West 2000)); 
S.B. 525, 100th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 1997) (codified as amended at TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 1-3-105, 
29-2-101, and tit. 47); S.B. 819, 1999 Sess. (Va. 1999) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 1-13.32 and 2.1-7.4 (2000))). 
64. Id. at 295–96 n.13 (citing Alabama Electronic Tax Return Filing Act, codified as amended at 
ALA. CODE §§ 40-30-1 to -6 (West 2000) (authorizing the filing of electronic tax returns)). 
65. See id. at 296 n.14 (noting that Massachusetts and Michigan had not passed any electronic 
signature legislation as of August 2000). 
66. Id. at 296. 
67. The ULC, formerly known as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws (NCCUSL), was established in 1892 and is composed of appointed commissioners from all 
fifty states. The ULC’s goal is to “research, draft, and promote enactment of uniform state laws in 
areas of state law where uniformity is desirable and practical.” About the ULC, UNIFORM L. 
COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=About%20the%20ULC (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2013). In its history, the ULC has drafted hundreds of laws, including the Uniform 
Commercial Code. Acts, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Acts.aspx (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2013). 
68. Electronic Transactions Act Summary, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Electronic%20Transactions%20Act (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2013). 
69. See UETA, supra note 9. 
70. Diane Duhaime, Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (“UCITA”), Uniform 
Electronic Transactions Act (“UETA”), and Federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National 
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writing, all but three states—New York, Illinois, and Washington—have 
adopted UETA.71 
A.  UETA Was Designed to Broadly Cover Electronic Transactions 
and to Create Parity with Pen-and-Paper Signatures 
The stated goal of UETA is “to remove barriers to electronic 
commerce by validating and effectuating electronic records and 
signatures”72 so that the electronic signature or record is not “denied 
legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form.”73 
UETA applies broadly to electronic records and signatures relating to 
consumer, business, commercial, and governmental transactions.74 Still, 
its scope is not without limits: UETA does not apply to wills, codicils, or 
testamentary trusts; large sections of the Uniform Commercial Code; or 
any other law identified by the enacting state.75 Additionally, UETA 
does not require parties to contract electronically,76 and it applies only to 
the extent that parties choose to do so.77 In practice, this means that 
UETA governs situations where a woman cancels her insurance 
coverage online with the click of a button,78 or where attorneys to a 
lawsuit reach a settlement agreement via an email exchange.79 
The effect of UETA is primarily procedural insofar as it leaves in 
place the substantive rules of contracts.80 For example, the Act defers to 
                                                     
Commerce Act (“E-SIGN”), 2 SIXTH ANN. INTERNET L. INST. 499, 535–44 (July 2002). 
71. Electronic Transactions Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION http://www.uniformlaws.org/ 
Act.aspx?title=Electronic%20Transactions%20Act (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). 
72. See UETA, supra note 9, Prefatory Note. 
73. Id. § 7(a). 
74. Id. § 2(16) (defining “transaction”). Consumers are not explicitly listed in this definition, 
although the official comment to that section states that “[t]he term [‘transaction’] includes all 
interactions between people for business, commercial, including specifically consumer, or 
governmental purposes.” Id. § 2 cmt. 12. The comments make clear that UETA also applies 
between two individuals who may both qualify as consumers under other law; for example, two 
individuals who arrange the sale of a used car through an Internet auction site would be covered 
under UETA. Id. 
75. Id. § 3(b). 
76. See id. § 5(a). 
77. Id. § 5(b). 
78. Barwick v. Gov’t Emp. Ins. Co., Inc., 2011 Ark. 128 (2011). 
79. Waddle v. Elrod, 367 S.W.3d 217 (Tenn. 2012). 
80. See UETA, supra note 9, Prefatory Note; see also BUCKLEY ET AL., supra note 1, § 3:2 
(“[UETA] recognizes the inherent flexibility and adaptability of the common law, and the wide 
variety of substantive statutes that already exist and will be just as applicable to electronic records 
as they are to written documents. For example, nothing in UETA alters UCC Article 2’s substantive 
rules applicable to a sale of goods.”). 
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state law regarding “(1) the meaning and effect of ‘sign’ . . . (2) the 
method and manner of displaying, transmitting and formatting 
information . . . (3) rules of attribution . . . and (4) the law of 
mistake . . . .”81 These provisions ensure that electronic records and 
signatures mirror the treatment of hard copy records and pen-and-paper 
signatures under state law.82 
B. UETA Broadly Recognizes All Forms of Electronic Signatures 
Significantly, UETA is technology-neutral in that it does not 
subscribe to any particular technological requirements to verify the 
identity of the parties and the integrity of the transaction.83 This 
approach directly contrasts with the early attempts of states like Utah 
and Washington to limit legal recognition to digital signatures.84 By 
defining the term “electronic” to broadly include any kind of “electrical, 
digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, [or] electromagnetic”85 technology, 
the UETA drafters signaled their intent to assure that the Act “will be 
applied broadly as new technologies develop . . . regardless of the 
medium used by the parties.”86 While most modern technologies fall 
within this definition, UETA also encourages courts to construe the term 
liberally so that the Act covers all “intangible media which are 
technologically capable of storing, transmitting and reproducing 
information in human perceivable form, but which lack the tangible 
aspect of paper, papyrus or stone.”87 By this methodology, markets and 
people are free to select technologies and business methods according to 
their needs without having to plan around legal strictures.88 
UETA’s definition for “electronic signatures” also helps reconceive 
what an electronic signature can be. While the term “signature” 
frequently connotes the signer’s name written in script,89 an electronic 
signature under UETA is “an electronic sound, symbol, or process 
                                                     
81. UETA, supra note 9, Prefatory Note. 
82. See id. 
83. See id. (“Nor is [UETA] a digital signature statute.”). 
84. Compare Utah Digital Signature Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-103(10) (West Supp. 1998) 
(defining “digital signature”), with UETA, supra note 9, § 2(8) (defining “electronic signature”). 
85. UETA, supra note 9, § 2(5). 
86. Id. § 2 cmt. 4. Indeed, the drafters believed that the Act is not even limited by the term 
“electronic,” as UETA “is intended to apply to all records and signatures created, used and stored by 
any medium which permits the information to be retrieved in perceivable form.” Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Fry, supra note 49, at 249–50. 
89. HAWKINS, supra note 31, at 7. 
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attached to or logically associated with a record and executed or adopted 
by a person with the intent to sign the record.”90 Therefore, an electronic 
signature could consist of anything from a digitized picture of a 
handwritten signature to the process of “clicking through a series of 
screens to affirm intention to make an Internet purchase.”91 Under 
UETA, as under common law, the form the signature takes is less 
important than the intention to sign the record.92 
C. UETA Provides Guidance for Addressing Attribution Issues 
Early in the development of electronic signature laws, some state 
legislatures hesitated to recognize electronic signatures due to doubts 
about verifying the signer’s identity.93 Such concerns gave rise to Utah’s 
digital signature statute, which contained provisions for authenticating 
an electronic signature.94 In contrast, UETA’s approach is to recognize 
electronic signatures broadly, regardless of how verifiable they are.95 
Should the validity of a signature or a record come into question, UETA 
allows the parties to prove the signer’s identity in “any manner, 
including . . . the efficacy of any security procedure . . . .”96 
For example, UETA builds off of court rulings that a facsimile may 
be attributed to an individual by using information other than a 
signature, such as the letterhead or the information printed across the top 
of the page indicating the machine from which it was sent.97 Similarly, 
numerical codes, personal identification numbers, public and private key 
combinations, and other security procedures would all serve under 
UETA to establish the party to whom an electronic record should be 
attributed.98 
In drafting UETA, the Committee deliberately declined to give legal 
preference to any particular security procedure.99 Instead, the strength of 
the security procedure affects only the weight to be accorded the 
                                                     
90. UETA, supra note 9, § 2(8) (emphasis added). 
91. Fry, supra note 49, at 257 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
92. BUCKLEY ET AL., supra note 1, § 1:2(A). 
93. See supra Part I.B. 
94. UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-101 (West Supp. 1998). 
95. See UETA, supra note 9, § 2(8). 
96. Id. § 9(a). 
97. Id. § 9 cmt. 3. 
98. Id. § 2(14) (defining “security procedure”); id. § 9 cmt. 4. 
99. Fry, supra note 49, at 258. 
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evidence as tending to establish attribution.100 This approach creates 
flexibility among the parties to allow future technological development 
without influence from legal requirements.101 As a result, transacting 
parties have the freedom “to select procedures that combine the 
appropriate blend of assurance with costs.”102 To the extent that a 
dispute arises, any technological or contextual evidence would be 
admissible to prove the identification of the signing party.103 
D. All States Have Adopted UETA Except for Illinois, New York, and 
Washington 
Adoption of UETA was fast and near-universal.104 Within a year after 
UETA was finalized, eighteen states had enacted UETA, and it was 
under consideration in eleven more.105 Of the states that originally 
passed a digital signature statute,106 all but Washington adopted UETA 
by the end of 2001.107 By 2002, forty-one states and the District of 
Columbia had adopted UETA.108 
Today, only Illinois, New York, and Washington have not adopted 
UETA.109 However, both Illinois and New York have adopted broad 
definitions of “electronic signature” that parallel UETA’s definition.110 
The Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act,111 which was adopted in 
                                                     
100. UETA, supra note 9, § 9 cmt. 4. 
101. Id. § 2 cmt. 11 (regarding security procedures). 
102. Fry, supra note 49, at 258. 
103. UETA, supra note 9, § 9; see also Fry, supra note 49, at 258. 
104. BUCKLEY ET AL., supra note 1, § 3:3 (“Since the statute was only made available to the 
states in the latter part of 1999 and constitutes a significant departure from existing law, this is a 
remarkably rapid enactment rate.”). 
105. Wittie & Winn, supra note 3, at 296. 
106. Utah, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, and Washington gave legal 
recognition only to digital signatures. Wittie & Winn, supra note 3, at 298 n.24. 
107. See Duhaime, supra note 70, at 535–44. 
108. Id. 
109. Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/uniform-electronic-transactions-acts.aspx (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2013). 
110. Compare 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/5-105 (defining “electronic” and “electronic signature” to 
include “electrical, digital, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, or any other form . . . that entails 
capabilities similar to these technologies”), and N.Y. STATE TECH. LAW §§ 102(1), (2) (McKinney 
2003) (defining “electronic” and “electronic signature” to mean “technology having electrical, 
digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities”), with UETA, supra 
note 9, §§ 2(5), (8) (defining “electronic” and “electronic signature” to mean “technology having 
electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities”). 
111. Electronic Commerce Security Act, 1998 Ill. Laws 4191 (codified as amended at 5 ILL. 
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1998 before the issuance of UETA, broadly recognizes “electrical, 
digital, magnetic, optical, [and] electromagnetic” signatures.112 Although 
Illinois has not amended its law since the passage of either UETA or 
ESIGN, it has adopted the Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording 
Act,113 which borrows from UETA’s definitions.114 
New York first passed its Electronic Signatures and Records Act in 
1999,115 which originally defined “electronic signature” to mean “an 
electronic identifier, including without limitation a digital 
signature . . . .”116 In 2002, the New York legislature broadened that 
definition to match ESIGN’s definition of “electronic signature”117 to 
avoid a potential preemption challenge.118 Those amendments were 
introduced at the request of the New York Office for Technology, and 
the question of whether to adopt UETA was not then before the 
legislature.119 The reason New York still has not adopted UETA may be 
                                                     
COMP. STAT. ANN. 175/1-105 to 175/99-1 (West Supp. 2005)). Section 5-105 provides: “‘Electronic 
signature’ means a signature in electronic form attached to or logically associated with an electronic 
record.” Id. § 175/5-105. 
112. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 175/5-105 (West Supp. 2005). The Illinois law is not without its 
critics. See, e.g., Martin I. Behn, The Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act: Too Much Too 
Soon or Too Little Too Late?, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 201, 204 (2000) (concluding that while the statute 
succeeds in establishing legal legitimacy of electronic records and signatures, its establishment of 
special categories of electronic records and the signatures and evidentiary presumptions attached to 
those special categories hinder the growth of e-commerce); Stephanie Lillie, Note, Will ESIGN 
Force States to Adopt UETA?, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 21, 30 (2001) (arguing that the Illinois law is 
preempted by ESIGN because it creates different categories of e-signatures with different 
evidentiary presumptions as to authenticity). 
113. See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 33/1–33/99 (West 2012). The purpose of the Uniform Real 
Property Electronic Recording Act is “to give county clerks and recorders the legal authority to 
prepare for electronic recording of real property instruments.” Real Property Electronic Recording 
Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Real%20Property%20 
Electronic%20Recording%20Act (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). 
114. See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 33/2(4) (West 2013) (defining “electronic signature” in 
UETA terms); id. § 33/3(a) (“If a law requires, as a condition for recording, that a document be an 
original, be on paper or another tangible medium, or be in writing, the requirement is satisfied by an 
electronic document . . . .”); id. § 33/3(b) (“If a law requires, as a condition for recording, that a 
document be signed, the requirement is satisfied by an electronic signature.”). 
115. Act of Sept. 28, 1999, ch. 4, 1999 N.Y. Laws 92. 
116. Id. § 101(3), 1999 N.Y. Laws at 93. 
117. Act of Aug. 6, 2002, ch. 314, 2002 N.Y. Laws 3144. The New York legislature indicated 
that its intent was to have the state law “work in tandem” with the federal ESIGN law. Id. § 1, 2002 
N.Y. Laws at 3144. 
118. Letter from Sen. Kemp Hannon to James McGuire, Counsel to the Governor, dated Aug. 6, 
2002, Bill Jacket, S.B. 7289, ch. 314, at 3–4. For more information on the federal law ESIGN and 
preemption analysis, see infra Part III.B. 
119. Letter from Sen. Kemp Hannon to James McGuire, Counsel to the Governor, dated Aug. 6, 
2002, Bill Jacket, S.B. 7289, ch. 314, at 4. 
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attributable to an overall delay in the legislature’s adoption of uniform 
laws.120 For example, New York is the only state that has not enacted the 
1990 revised version of UCC Articles 3 and 4.121 
III.  ESIGN PROVIDES A FEDERAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
UNIFORM ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE LAWS 
At the turn of the millennia, Congress entered the debate to promote 
uniformity amongst the states with regard to electronic signature laws.122 
High-tech and financial services industries in particular were concerned 
about the length of time it would likely take the states to uniformly adopt 
UETA, especially in light of states making significant non-uniform 
amendments to UETA.123 The federal response to these concerns was the 
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act 
(ESIGN).124 
A. Similar to UETA, ESIGN Was Designed to Give Broad Recognition 
to Electronic Signatures and to Facilitate Electronic Contracting 
ESIGN was enacted in 2000 on the simple premise that “[a]ny 
requirement in law that a contract be signed or that a document be in 
writing can be met by an electronically signed contract or an electronic 
document.”125 In other words, the goal was to give “the electronic 
medium the same legal effect and enforceability as the medium of 
paper.”126 Like UETA, ESIGN does not require parties to transact in an 
electronic medium,127 and it is ultimately a procedural law that does not 
                                                     
120. Frederick A. Brodie & James M. Haddad, New York’s Proposed UCC Amendments: Back to 
the Future, N.Y. L.J. (June 21, 2012), available at http://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/ 
Publications/NYLJ_AR_62112.pdf. 
121. Id. 
122. See infra Part III.A; 146 CONG. REC. H4351–52 (daily ed. June 14, 2000) (statement of Rep. 
Bliley), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2000-06-14/pdf/CREC-2000-06-14-pt1-
PgH4346-7.pdf. 
123. Jeremiah S. Buckley & R. Colgate Selden, Federal Preemption Under the ESIGN Act, 
ELECTRONIC BANKING L. & COM. REP. (Glasser LegalWorks, Little Falls, N.J.), Feb. 2005, at 6. For 
one example of a state making significant, non-uniform amendments to UETA, see California’s 
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, codified at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1633.1–.17 (West Supp. 2011) 
(excluding a large number of state laws from the scope of UETA). 
124. Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114 Stat. 464 (2000) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001–06 
(2006)). 
125. 146 CONG. REC. H4352 (daily ed. June 14, 2000) (statement of Rep. Bliley), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2000-06-14/pdf/CREC-2000-06-14-pt1-PgH4346-7.pdf. 
126. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a). 
127. Id. § 7001(b)(2) (“[This title] does not . . . require any person to agree to use or accept 
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otherwise affect the rights or obligations of the contracting parties.128 
The jurisdictional scope of ESIGN has broad reach, sweeping into its 
purview any transaction “in or affecting interstate or foreign 
commerce.”129 That said, ESIGN does not apply to state governments 
where the state itself is a party to a contract.130 
Like UETA, ESIGN also exempts certain substantive areas of laws 
from its ambit: adoption, divorce, or other matters of family law; laws 
governing the creation and execution of wills, codicils, or testamentary 
trusts; and most provisions of the UCC.131 Additionally, ESIGN contains 
consumer consent protections that limit the use of some e-records where 
other law requires that information be made available to consumers in 
writing,132 constituting one of the most substantial differences between 
ESIGN and UETA.133 
In language almost identical to UETA, ESIGN also defines 
“electronic,”134 “electronic signature,”135 and “electronic record”136 in 
                                                     
electronic records or electronic signatures . . . .”). 
128. Id. § 7001(b)(1) (“[This title] does not limit, alter, or otherwise affect any requirement 
imposed by a statute, regulation, or rule of law relating to the rights and obligations of persons 
under such statute, regulation, or rule of law other than a requirement that contracts or other records 
be written, signed, or in nonelectronic form . . . .”). UETA reaches the same substantive result. 
UETA, supra note 9, § 3(d) (“A transaction subject to this [Act] is also subject to other applicable 
substantive law.”). For example, “all of the elements of a contract (such as offer, acceptance, 
capacity and consideration) must be present in an electronic context.” Buckley & Selden, supra note 
123. 
129. Pub. L. No. 106-229 (“An Act To [sic] facilitate the use of electronic records and signatures 
in interstate or foreign commerce.”). This Comment does not explore the outer limit of ESIGN’s 
jurisdictional reach, but at least one court has noted that ESIGN could potentially reach transactions 
that would normally be governed by state law if the transaction had an economic effect on interstate 
commerce. See People v. McFarlan, 744 N.Y.S.2d 287, 294 n.8 (Sup. Ct. 2002) (citing Wickard v. 
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)). 
130. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001(b)(2), 7002(b). 
131. Id. § 7003(a). 
132. Id. § 7003(b)(2) (excluding notices of cancellation of utility services; default, acceleration, 
repossession, foreclosure, or eviction for a primary residence of an individual; health or life 
insurance cancellations or benefit changes; and a product recall). “Tangible documents are required 
in these instances because of the importance to life, home, and safety.” Lillie, supra note 112, at 24. 
133. Wittie & Winn, supra note 3, at 332. 
134. 5 U.S.C. § 7006(2) (“The term ‘electronic’ means relating to technology having electrical, 
digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities.”). 
135. Id. § 7006(5) (“The term ‘electronic signature’ means an electronic sound, symbol, or 
process, attached to or logically associated with a contract or other record and executed or adopted 
by a person with the intent to sign the record.”). 
136. Id. § 7006(4) (“The term ‘electronic record’ means a contract or other record created, 
generated, sent, communicated, received, or stored by electronic means.”). 
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broad, technologically neutral terms.137 This is not a coincidence: the 
ESIGN drafters followed many of the same UETA definitions to help 
create uniformity of laws and to advance the legislative goal of 
facilitating electronic transactions.138 
B.  ESIGN’s Unique Preemption Provisions Allow Some States’ Laws 
to Preempt Federal Law 
As part of its legislative goal to encourage broad recognition of 
electronic signatures, Congress added unique preemption provisions to 
ESIGN that allow states to “modify, limit or supersede [some] 
provisions of . . . the Act” if, and only if, certain conditions are met.139 
State law can supersede ESIGN if: (1) the state enacts the official 
version of UETA as passed by the ULC in 1999;140 or (2) the state’s law 
is consistent with ESIGN141 and is technologically neutral.142 
This unique preemption language reflects the competing legislative 
priorities Congress faced as it drafted ESIGN.143 On the one hand, 
Congress wanted to encourage nationwide recognition of electronic 
signatures and records.144 Federal action was seen as a necessary 
response to states that were slow to enact electronic signature laws, or to 
states that had made significant amendments to their UETA laws.145 On 
the other hand, the ULC had already spent several years drafting UETA, 
and many states had adopted some variation of it.146 If ESIGN had 
entirely preempted UETA just as the states were adopting it, Congress 
could have faced criticism for injecting federal law into an area 
traditionally reserved for the states.147 Deference to the ULC was also 
                                                     
137. Compare id. § 7006, with UETA, supra note 9, § 2. “Technological neutrality” is a term 
used throughout this Comment. It refers to laws that broadly recognize all kinds of electronic 
signatures, regardless of their form. In contrast, a law that prescribes a particular technology—such 
as a digital signature—is not technologically neutral. See supra Part I.B. 
138. Wittie & Winn, supra note 3, at 297–98. 
139. 15 U.S.C. § 7002(a) (providing for the preemption of section 7001 of that title); Buckley & 
Selden, supra note 123. 
140. 15 U.S.C. § 7002(a)(1). 
141. Id. § 7002(a)(2)(A)(i). 
142. Id. § 7002(a)(2)(A)(ii). Additionally, if a state enacts an electronic signature law other than 
UETA after the passage of ESIGN, the law must make specific reference to ESIGN. Id. 
§ 7002(a)(2)(B). 
143. Buckley & Selden, supra note 123, at 4. 
144. Wittie & Winn, supra note 3, at 325. 
145. Id. at 296. 
146. Id. at 325. 
147. Buckley & Selden, supra note 123, at 4. 
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politically advisable as the organization has a long history of producing 
high-quality uniform laws for state enactment.148 Indeed, congressional 
deference to UETA is apparent in ESIGN insofar as ESIGN borrows 
heavily from UETA’s conceptual underpinnings and adopts nearly 
identical provisions from certain portions of the text, including sections 
that broadly define “electronic signatures” and “electronic records.”149 
1. ESIGN Allows the Official Version of UETA to Supersede Federal 
Law 
Instead of outright preempting UETA, the ESIGN drafters 
encouraged its adoption as the national standard by allowing UETA to 
supersede ESIGN as long as a state adopts the official version of 
UETA.150 Any state modification to UETA therefore raises significant 
interpretive issues as to whether the modification or ESIGN governs.151 
A key question of interpretation is whether ESIGN preempts only those 
state modifications that are inconsistent with federal law, or if the state 
modification means that the entire text of the state’s UETA law must 
undergo a preemption analysis for inconsistent provisions.152 This 
preemption analysis may also depend on whether (a) the state makes 
only stylistic changes to its UETA law; (b) the state enacts UETA but 
adds provisions; or (c) the state enacts UETA but omits provisions.153 
Under the first category, a state’s stylistic changes, which do not 
otherwise affect the substance of UETA, would arguably withstand a 
preemption challenge.154 Similarly, if the state adopts UETA but adds 
                                                     
148. Id. 
149. Id. (referring to sections 101 and 106 of UETA). 
150. Id. at 6. 
151. 146 Cong. Rec. H4353 (daily ed. June 14, 2000) available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2000-06-14/pdf/CREC-2000-06-14-pt1-PgH4346-7.pdf (“It 
is intended that any State that enacts or adopts UETA in its State to remove itself from Federal 
preemption pursuant to subsection (a)(1) shall be required to enact or adopt UETA without 
amendment. Any variation or derivation from the exact UETA document reported and 
recommended for enactment by [ULC] shall not qualify under subsection (a)(1). Instead, such 
efforts and any other effort may or may not be eligible under subsection (a)(2). Thus, a State that 
enacted a modified version of UETA would not be preempted to the extent that the enactment or 
adoption by a State met the conditions imposed in subsection (a)(2).”); Wittie & Winn, supra note 
3, at 329–30. 
152. Wittie & Winn, supra note 3, at 329–30; see also Shea C. Meehan & D. Benjamin Beard, 
What Hath Congress Wrought: E-SIGN, the UETA, and the Question of Preemption, 37 IDAHO L. 
REV. 389, 400–05 (2001) (discussing this interpretive dilemma as applied to various state 
enactments of UETA). 
153. Buckley & Selden, supra note 123, at 6–7 (referring to sections 101 and 106 of UETA). 
154. Id. 
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provisions that do not affect the substance of UETA, those additions 
could be considered separate legislative enactments that do not trigger 
ESIGN’s preemption provisions.155 However, a state that significantly 
alters the substance of UETA, either through additions or omissions, 
accordingly surrenders the right to claim exemption from ESIGN and 
would be subject to the preemption provisions of ESIGN governing 
consistency and technological neutrality.156 This would most likely 
threaten UETA provisions that directly conflict with ESIGN, most 
notably ESIGN’s consumer consent provisions.157 
2.  Alternatively, a State’s Electronic Signature Law Supersedes 
ESIGN if It Is Consistent with ESIGN and Is Technologically 
Neutral 
If a state does not adopt the official text of UETA, a state law may 
still adopt alternative procedures as long as they are consistent with 
ESIGN158 and they are technologically neutral.159 More than ten years 
after the enactment of ESIGN, these unique preemption provisions 
remain largely untested in the courts.160 This lack of preemption 
litigation may be due, in part, to the reality that there is significant 
substantive overlap between ESIGN and the various state laws, and so 
                                                     
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Meehan & Beard, supra note 152, at 411–12; Wittie & Winn, supra note 3, at 332. 
158. 15 U.S.C. § 7002(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006). A state law can be consistent with ESIGN in one of 
two ways: either the state law imposes the same substantive rule as ESIGN, or it covers a subject 
area that is not addressed by ESIGN. Meehan & Beard, supra note 152, at 410; Wittie & Winn, 
supra note 3, at 331. For example, a state may still enact an e-signature law that contains provisions 
that are outside the scope of ESIGN, such as provisions governing attribution of electronic 
signatures, the time when messages are deemed sent or received, the effect of change or error in an 
electronic record, and admissibility of electronic records and signatures in evidence, or the 
transferability of records. Id. 
159. 15 U.S.C. § 7002(a)(2)(A)(ii). The legislative history regarding technological neutrality 
shows that Congress “intended to prevent a state from giving a leg up or impos[ing] an additional 
burden on one technology or technical specification that is not applicable to all others . . . .” 146 
CONG. REC. S5285 (daily ed. June 16, 2000) (statement of Sen. Abraham). This provision directly 
implicates state laws that specify a particular technology, such as Utah’s former Digital Signature 
Act, which gives legal significance only to digital signatures that meet certain security procedures. 
Utah Digital Signature Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-101 to -504 (West Supp. 1998) (repealed 
2006). 
160. D. Benjamin Beard, 10 Hawkland UCC Series UETA § 3.3 (“Perhaps the difficult and 
convoluted analyses seemingly required to determine whether a state law, including an enactment of 
UETA, has been preempted by E-Sign is not as significant an issue as may first have 
appeared . . . [I]n the vast majority of situations, there will be no difference between an outcome 
under E-Sign and UETA. Therefore, the question of preemption will in almost all cases be moot.”). 
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the preemption question can generally be avoided.161 Still, for parties 
who are interested in planning their transactions in accordance with state 
and federal law, it is relevant to examine whether a state’s e-signature 
law is in conflict with ESIGN. 
IV.  DESPITE THE RISE OF ESIGN AND UETA, WASHINGTON 
STATE HAS RETAINED ITS ELECTRONIC 
AUTHENTICATION ACT 
Washington State was one of the first to adopt a digital signature law 
with the passage of the Washington Electronic Authentication Act 
(WEAA).162 A digital signature—a subset of the broader category of 
electronic signatures—refers to specific security protocols utilizing PKI 
technology.163 Since WEAA’s initial passage, the Washington legislature 
has taken several steps to modernize its law by amending WEAA to 
include electronic signatures,164 but it has not taken the further step of 
adopting UETA or synchronizing its law with ESIGN.165 Today, WEAA 
remains the law of Washington.166 
A. Washington’s Law Still Reflects Its Digital Signature Roots Despite 
Amendments to Incorporate Electronic Signatures 
Concerned about potential fraud in electronic transactions, the 
Washington legislature enacted WEAA in 1996, which initially gave 
legal recognition only to digital signatures that met specific security 
procedures.167 In 1999, the same year that UETA was issued, 
Washington State amended its law to cover electronic signatures, but it 
left untouched many substantive provisions regarding digital 
signatures.168 
                                                     
161. Id.; see also People v. McFarlan, 744 N.Y.S.2d 287, 294 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002) (“Although 
there are clear conflicts between E Sign and [the New York statute, ESRA,] for many purposes, the 
same result would obtain in this case whether E-Sign or ESRA applies, and accordingly, the 
constitutional and preemption issues need not be reached in rendering this decision.”). 
162. See Washington Electronic Authentication Act, ch. 250, 1996 Wash. Sess. Laws 1190. 
163. See supra Part I.A. 
164. See Act of May 13, 1999, ch. 287, 1999 Wash. Sess. Laws 1203. 
165. See infra Part IV.C. 
166. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.34.010–.903 (2012). 
167. See Washington Electronic Authentication Act, ch. 250, 1996 Wash. Sess. Laws 1190. 
168. See Act of May 13, 1999, ch. 287, 1999 Wash. Sess. Laws 1203. 
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1.  In 1996, Washington Adopted a Digital Signature Statute that 
Gave Preference to Certain Secure Technologies 
Before UETA and ESIGN were ever on the drawing board, 
Washington State enacted WEAA in 1996.169 Its original stated purpose 
was fourfold: (1) to facilitate commerce by means of reliable electronic 
messages; (2) to minimize the incidence of forged digital signatures and 
fraud in electronic commerce; (3) to legally implement the import of 
relevant standards; and (4) to establish uniform rules with other states 
regarding the authentication and reliability of electronic messages.170 
In line with these goals, the original WEAA gave legal significance 
only to digital signatures171 that followed specific security protocols172 
pursuant to a state-run licensing program.173 For example, WEAA 
provides rules for the secretary of state to license “certification 
authorities”174 that in turn issue a “certificate,” which contains public 
and private keys to confirm a subscriber’s electronic identity.175 In order 
to issue a certificate, the certification authority must confirm the 
accuracy of the information in the certificate by making a reasonable 
inquiry as to the subscriber’s identity,176 and it must meet technical 
requirements to ensure that the private and public keys correspond and 
are capable of creating a digital signature.177 
                                                     
169. Washington Electronic Authentication Act, ch. 250, 1996 Wash. Sess. Laws 1190 (codified 
as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 19.34.010–.903). 
170. Id. § 102. 
171. Id. § 401 (“Where a rule of law requires a signature . . . that rule is satisfied by a digital 
signature . . . .”) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 19.34.300(1)). 
172. Id. § 103(10) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 19.34.020(11)) (defining “digital signature” 
as “a transformation of a message using an asymmetric cryptosystem such that a person having the 
initial message and the signer’s public key can accurately determine: (a) whether the transformation 
was created using the private key that corresponds to the signer’s public key; and (b) whether the 
initial message has been altered since the transformation was made”). 
173. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.34.030. 
174. Id. § 19.34.020(5) (defining “certification authority” to mean “a person who issues a 
certificate”). 
175. Id. § 19.34.020(4) (defining “certificate” as “a computer-based record that: (a) Identifies the 
certification authority issuing it; (b) Names or identifies its subscriber; (c) Contains the subscriber’s 
public key; and (d) Is digitally signed by the certification authority issuing it”); see also id. 
§ 19.34.020(38) (defining “subscriber” as “a person who (a) Is the subject listed in the certificate; 
(b) Applies for or accepts the certificate; and (c) Holds a private key that corresponds to a public 
key listed in that certificate”). 
176. Id. § 19.34.210(1)(b), (2). 
177. Id. § 19.34.210(1)(iv)–(vi); see also S. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, SENATE BILL REPORT SB 
6069, S. 62-6069, Reg. Sess., at 2 (Wash. 2012) for a summation of the current law: “WEAA 
prescribes rules for various electronic transactions: (1) issuing certificates, which are computer-
based records that identify the certification authority issuing it, names or identifies the subscriber, 
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2.  The 1999 Amendments Make New Provisions for Electronic 
Signatures 
In May 1999, the legislature amended WEAA to allow for additional 
technologies beyond digital signatures.178 First, the scope of the Act was 
broadened to “ensure that electronic signatures are not denied legal 
recognition solely because they are in electronic form.”179 The terms 
“electronic” and “electronic signature” were added, with “electronic” 
defined broadly as an “electrical, digital, magnetic, optical, 
electromagnetic, or any other form of technology that entails capabilities 
similar to these technologies.”180 “Electronic signature” was defined as 
“a signature in electronic form attached to or logically associated with an 
electronic record, including but not limited to a digital signature.”181 
Second, the licensing mechanism for digital signature certification 
authorities, described above, was re-designated as a voluntary system for 
private enterprises.182 State and local government entities, on the other 
hand, were still required to use digital signatures when conducting 
official business.183 
Third, the legislature designated special recognition for digital 
signatures by providing that presumptions of validity, reasonableness of 
conduct, and the limitations of liability do not apply to electronic 
signatures except for digital signatures created in conformance with the 
Act.184 Additionally, the legislature provided that a digitally signed 
message—as opposed to an electronically signed one—shall be deemed 
                                                     
contains the subscriber’s public key, and is digitally signed by the certification authority issuing it; 
(2) issuing, enforcing, suspending, and revoking licenses to certification authorities, persons who 
are issued certificates; (3) issuing certificates to subscribers and the representations and duties that 
correspond with the acceptance of the certificate; and (4) satisfying signature requirements.” Id. 
178. Act of May 13, 1999, ch. 287, 1999 Wash. Sess. Laws 1203. 
179. Id. § 3, 1999 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1207 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 19.34.010(2)). 
180. Id. § 2(12), 1999 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1204 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 19.34.020(12)). 
181. Id. § 2(14), 1999 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1204 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 19.34.020(14)). 
182. Id. § 1(3), 1999 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1203; id. § 12(1), 1999 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1215 
(requiring local or state governments to become subscribers to a licensed certification authority for 
purposes of conducting official business); see also id. § 1(4), 1999 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1203 
(providing that the Act’s purpose is to establish procedures governing the use of digital signatures 
for official public business). 
183. Id. § 1(4), 1999 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1203; id. § 12(1), 1999 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1215. 
184. Id. § 3, 1999 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1207 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 19.34.360). 
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the original of that message.185 
Finally, the 1999 amendments are also significant for what they did 
not change: the legislature declined to replace “digital signature” with 
“electronic signature” throughout the Electronic Authentication Act. For 
example, RCW 19.34.300 still provides that “where a rule of law 
requires a signature . . . that rule is satisfied by a digital 
signature . . . .”186 RCW 19.34.320 similarly states that “[a] message is 
as valid, enforceable, and effective as if it had been written on paper, if 
it . . . [b]ears in its entirety a digital signature . . . .”187 Additionally, 
RCW 19.34.321 still provides that “[a] person may not refuse to honor, 
accept, or act upon a court order, writ, or warrant upon the basis that it is 
electronic in form and signed with a digital signature.”188 Thus, the 
legislature broadened the stated purpose of the Act to include “electronic 
signatures,”189 but it otherwise did not change the underlying substantive 
commands of the Act that give legal recognition to digital signatures.190 
 
3.  The 2011 Amendments Rendered WEAA Optional for State and 
 Local Governments 
 
In 2011, the state legislature responded to a request from the 
Washington Secretary of State’s office regarding the mandated use of 
digital signatures and their onerous certification requirements.191 Instead 
of requiring state and local governments to use digital signatures, the 
legislature amended WEAA to provide that the government “may” use 
digital signatures.192 Accordingly, Washington’s complicated digital 
signature schema is now an entirely voluntary system for both public 
and private parties. 
                                                     
185. Id. § 15, 1999 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1218 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 19.34.330). 
186. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.34.300(1). 
187. Id. § 19.34.320. 
188. Id. § 19.34.321. 
189. Act of May 13, 1999, ch. 287, § 1(2), 1999 Wash. Sess. Laws 1203, 1203. 
190. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.34.300(1). 
191. Certification of Enrollment, H.B. 1040, 62d Leg., 2011 Reg. Sess., at 2 (Wash. 2011) (“by 
request of Secretary of State”), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2011-
12/Pdf/Bills/House%20Passed%20Legislature/1040.PL.pdf. 
192. Act of Apr. 29, 2011, ch. 183, 2011 Wash. Sess. Laws 1377 (codified as amended WASH. 
REV. CODE § 19.34.231). 
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B.  In 1999, the Washington State Bar Association’s Cyberspace 
Committee Recommended Against Adopting UETA 
Although WEAA has been the law in Washington since 1996, two 
attempts have been made to adopt UETA. The first attempt was in 
1999—several months after the passage of UETA—when the 
Washington State Bar Association’s Law of Commerce in Cyberspace 
Committee considered whether to recommend its adoption to the state 
legislature.193 At the time of its recommendation, UETA was untested: 
only California had adopted it, and in doing so it had made substantial 
amendments to the text.194 Believing UETA to be flawed, the 
Cyberspace Committee recommended against enactment of UETA 
because it unintentionally did more to disable electronic commerce than 
to enable it.195 In total, the Cyberspace Committee’s report identified 
thirteen primary problems with UETA.196 The Committee feared that 
many of UETA’s provisions were ambiguous,197 created additional 
burdens on electronic transacting,198 or should be cut entirely from 
                                                     
193. LAW OF COMMERCE IN CYBERSPACE COMM. BUS. LAW SECTION, WASH. ST. BAR ASS’N, 
Report on the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (“UETA”) by the Law of Commerce in 
Cyberspace Committee (Nov. 6, 1999) [hereinafter CYBERSPACE REPORT] (on file with Washington 
Law Review). The Business Law Section of the Washington State Bar Association (WSBA) 
“established the Law of Commerce in Cyberspace Committee to address the global challenges 
resulting from the use of networks to conduct business transactions.” Law of Commerce in 
Cyberspace Committee, WSBA BUSINESS LAW, www.wabuslaw.org/CyberspaceCommittee.asp 
(last visited Apr. 28, 2013). The Cyberspace Committee analyzes “the increasingly complex agenda 
of issues emerging from the convergence of electronic commerce, infrastructure and information 
technologies.” Id. The 1999 Cyberspace Report cited in this section was approved by the Executive 
Committee of the Business Law Section of the WSBA, but it was not reviewed by the WSBA 
Legislative Committee or the Board of Governors, and therefore it does not represent an official 
position of the WSBA. Id. 
194. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1633.1–.17 (West 2011); see also Duhaime, supra note 70, at 535; 
Wittie & Winn, supra note 3, at 296 n.17. 
195. CYPERSPACE REPORT, supra note 193, § A(1). 
196. Id. § C. 
197. For example, the Committee was concerned that the definition of “electronic signature” 
confused the concepts of signature and consent, id. § C(1) (citing to UETA, supra note 9, § 2(8)); 
that the definition for “transaction” did not explicitly state whether consumer transactions were 
covered, id. § C(2) (citing to UETA, supra note 9, § 2(16)); and that UETA’s attribution provisions 
suggested, but did not clearly provide, that parties could agree on a method for proving attribution, 
id. § C(8) (citing to UETA, supra note 9, § 9). 
198. For example, the Committee questioned whether under UETA, contracting parties would be 
forced to create a master trading agreement before contracting electronically, id. § C(3) (citing to 
UETA, supra note 9, § 5(b)), or whether UETA would require compliance with certain other 
provisions of law that are infeasible in an electronic context, id. § C(6) (citing to UETA, supra note 
9, §§ 8(b)–(c)). 
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UETA.199 The subsequent passage of ESIGN, which borrows many of its 
substantive provisions from UETA, renders many of these early 
concerns moot.200 
Although the report focuses on line-by-line concerns with UETA,201 
the underlying goals of the Cyberspace Committee reflect the stated 
objectives of UETA: to promote uniformity, and to treat paper and 
electronic transactions equally.202 In acknowledging UETA’s goals, the 
Committee noted that it would undertake to review UETA again if the 
ULC made uniform amendments that addressed the Committee’s 
concerns.203 Today, the ULC has not updated UETA,204 and the 
Cyberspace Committee has not changed its official stance on UETA.205 
C. The Washington State Senate Recently Introduced a Bill to Adopt 
UETA 
In January 2012, the Judiciary Committee of the Washington State 
Senate introduced a bill to adopt the official version of UETA.206 As 
proposed, the draft bill sought to eliminate all other references to “digital 
signatures” throughout the Revised Code of Washington,207 and it 
completely repealed WEAA.208 
In response to the proposed adoption of UETA, the Washington State 
Bar Association’s Cyberspace Committee Chair testified at a public 
hearing that the Committee was not ready to change its 1999 
recommendation that the legislature not adopt UETA.209 As an 
                                                     
199. E.g., id. § C(10) (citing to UETA, supra note 9, § 10). 
200. See supra Part III.A. 
201. See generally CYPERSPACE REPORT, supra note 193, § C. 
202. Compare id. §§ D(1), (3) (discussing twin goals of uniformity and parity), with UETA, 
supra note 9, §§ 6(1), (3) (providing that the Act should facilitate electronic transactions consistent 
with other applicable law and in a uniform manner among the states). 
203. CYBERSPACE REPORT, supra note 193, § B. 
204. See Electronic Transactions Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://uniformlaws.org/ 
Act.aspx?title=Electronic%20Transactions%20Act (last visited Apr. 28, 2013). 
205. Hearing on S.B. 6069, supra note 24 (statement of Holly Towle, Committee Chair, Law of 
Commerce in Cyberspace Committee), available at http://www.tvw.org/index.php?option= 
com_tvwplayer&eventID=2012011130#start=361&stop=1174. For more discussion on the 
Cyberspace Committee’s current recommendation, see infra Part IV.C. 
206. S.B. 6069, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012), available at 
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2011-12/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Bills/6069.pdf. 
207. Id. §§ 21–27. 
208. Id. § 28 (repealing all of WASH. REV. CODE § 19.34).  
209. Hearing on S.B. 6069, supra note 24 (statement of Holly Towle, Committee Chair, Law of 
Commerce in Cyberspace Committee), available at http://www.tvw.org/index.php?option= 
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alternative to UETA, the Cyberspace Committee Chair suggested that 
the legislature pass a state version of ESIGN that would apply to 
governmental entities and intrastate commerce.210 
Following the hearing, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
recommended the UETA bill for passage without amendment, and it 
proceeded to the Senate Rules Committee for a second reading before it 
was placed in an “X-File” in February 2012.211 The bill was reintroduced 
in both the first and second special sessions of 2012 with no further 
action taken by the end of the 2011–12 legislative cycle.212 To date, no 
new legislation has been proposed to adopt UETA or a state version of 
ESIGN. 
V.  WASHINGTON STATE’S ELECTRONIC AUTHENTICATION 
ACT IS UNCLEAR AND THE LEGISLATURE SHOULD 
ADOPT UETA TO REPLACE IT 
Washington’s current law provides an uncertain statutory framework 
for parties transacting with electronic—as opposed to digital—
signatures. Because WEAA is likely not technologically neutral, 
interstate transactions would be preempted by ESIGN. Washington 
should clarify this confusing area of law and encourage the growth of 
electronic transacting by adopting UETA, a preferable option to the 
alternative of adopting a state version of ESIGN. 
A.  WEAA Is Unclear and Outdated, and It Has Created a Murky 
Legal Regime for Parties Contracting Electronically 
Washington’s Electronic Authentication Act is an anachronism from a 
technological past. Drafted in 1996,213 it was created before notable 
developments in the law of electronic signatures, including the passage 
                                                     
com_tvwplayer&eventID=2012011130#start=361&stop=1174. 
210. Id. 
211. 1 STATE OF WASHINGTON, SENATE JOURNAL SIXTY-SECOND LEGISLATURE 420 (2012), 
available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/billinfo/summary.aspx?bill=6069&year=2011. “After certain 
cut-off dates, as a house-keeping measure the Senate Rules Committee sometimes places bills no 
longer eligible for consideration in the ‘X-File.’” A Shorthand Guide to the Senate Rules 
Committee, WASH. ST. SEN. RULES COMM., available at 
http://www.leg.wa.gov/Senate/Committees/RULE/Pages/RulesShorthandGuide.aspx (last visited 
May 9, 2013). A bill will usually remain in the X-File until the end of the biennium. Id. 
212. STATE OF WASHINGTON, supra note 211, available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/billinfo/ 
summary.aspx?bill=6069&year=2011. 
213. Washington Electronic Authentication Act, ch. 250, 1996 Wash. Sess. Laws 1190. 
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of UETA214 and ESIGN.215 WEAA originally created a framework for 
giving legal recognition to digital signatures that used a cumbersome 
certification process regulated by the State.216 That certification process 
proved so limiting that today it has been rendered an entirely voluntary 
system for both private parties and state and local governments.217 
Despite the voluntary nature of Washington’s digital signature 
certification system, the statute gives ambiguous legal effect to 
electronic signatures. On the one hand, the legislature amended WEAA 
in 1999 so that its stated goal is “[t]o ensure that electronic signatures 
are not denied legal recognition solely because they are in electronic 
form.”218 This would signal that the legislature wanted to give broad 
legal recognition to all kinds of electronic signatures. On the other hand, 
WEAA’s roots as a digital signature statute are still apparent. For 
example, “digital signature” remains a defined term that incorporates 
specific certification procedures,219 and it is not interchangeable with 
WEAA’s definition of “electronic signature.”220 WEAA still provides 
that “[w]here a rule of law requires a signature, or provides for certain 
consequences in the absence of a signature, that rule is satisfied by a 
digital signature . . . .”221 Similarly, “[a] message is as valid, enforceable, 
and effective as if it had been written on paper, if it . . . [b]ears in its 
entirety a digital signature . . . .”222 WEAA thus fails to give the same 
explicit grant of recognition to electronic signatures as it does to digital 
signatures,223 leaving an open question for the courts to determine 
whether WEAA actually gives legal parity to electronic and paper 
signatures. 
This statutory conundrum is further compounded by Neuson v. 
Macy’s Department Stores Inc.,224 a 2011 decision where a Washington 
appellate court ruled that an electronic signature was neither “the same 
                                                     
214. UETA, supra note 9. 
215. Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114 Stat. 464 (2000) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001–06 
(2006)). 
216. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
217. See supra Part IV.A.3. 
218. Act of May 13, 1999, ch. 287, § 1(2), 1999 Wash. Sess. Laws 1203, 1203. 
219. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.34.020(11) (2012). 
220. Compare id. (defining “digital signature”), with id. § 19.34.020(14) (defining “electronic 
signature”). 
221. Id. § 19.34.300(1). 
222. Id. § 19.34.320. 
223. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
224. 160 Wash. App. 786, 249 P.3d 1054 (2011). 
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as [n]or better than a traditional signature.”225 In that case, an 
employee’s social security number, birth date, and zip code were used to 
generate an electronic signature on an arbitration contract. The court 
found that the e-signature was not reliable because the employer had 
access to the employee’s identifying information.226 Because the parties 
in that case did not brief the court on the existence of either WEAA or 
ESIGN,227 the court likely did not fully consider the issue, and its ruling 
was arguably erroneous. Even so, this case creates more murkiness in an 
area of law that is already unclear. In response, the case has prompted at 
least one firm to publicly recommend against employers using electronic 
signatures in Washington.228 
Out of fifty states, Washington is a true outlier in this regard. Forty-
seven states have adopted UETA, which clearly recognizes electronic 
signatures. Illinois and New York, the only other UETA holdouts, also 
explicitly recognize electronic signatures in their statutes. Washington 
State alone has failed to provide clarity in what should otherwise be a 
straightforward grant of recognition to electronic signatures. 
B.  WEAA Is Likely Preempted by ESIGN 
Regardless of how WEAA is interpreted in isolation, it must also pass 
a preemption analysis under ESIGN for transactions affecting or 
occurring in interstate commerce.229 ESIGN preempts state laws to the 
extent that the state law is not technologically neutral or it is inconsistent 
with ESIGN, unless the state has adopted the official version of 
UETA.230 If the language of WEAA gives legal preference to digital 
signatures—which it appears to do in numerous references to digital 
signatures at the exclusion of electronic signatures231—the Act is not 
technologically neutral, and ESIGN is by default the law governing 
interstate transactions in Washington State. 
Although ESIGN likely preempts WEAA for interstate transactions, 
                                                     
225. Id. at 796, 249 P.3d at 1058. 
226. Id. 
227. See Brief of Appellant, Neuson, 160 Wash. App. 786, 249 P.3d 1054 (No. 289681); Brief of 
Defendant-Respondent, Neuson, 160 Wash. App. 786, 249 P.3d 1054 (No. 289681); Appellant’s 
Reply Brief, Neuson, 160 Wash. App. 786, 249 P.3d 1054 (No. 289681). 
228. Frank Van Dusen, Electronic Employee Signature Invalidates Arbitration Agreement, 
MILLER NASH: ATTORNEYS AT LAW (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www.millernash.com/electronic-
employee-signature-invalidates-arbitration-agreement-04-04-2011/. 
229. See 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a) (2006). 
230. Id. § 7002(a). 
231. See supra Part V.A. 
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ESIGN does not apply to purely intrastate transactions232 or to 
transactions where the state or local government itself acts as a market 
participant.233 Because ESIGN does not apply to these parties, courts 
may return to WEAA to provide the relevant law. This could prove 
troublesome for parties seeking recognition of electronic signatures 
under WEAA: as discussed above,234 WEAA does not clearly protect 
parties that use electronic signatures other than digital signatures. Thus, 
for intrastate transactions or where state or local governments act as 
market participants, there is no certain statutory framework to support 
the transaction. 
C.  To Encourage a More Stable Contracting Environment, 
Washington Should Clarify Its Law and Adopt UETA 
In the absence of a clear statutory framework, Washington should 
adopt UETA in its official form. First, adoption of UETA would bring 
Washington in line with forty-seven other states, thus creating a more 
predictable environment for facilitating electronic contracting. Because 
Washington’s current statute for electronic signatures is unpredictable 
and untested by the courts, those who seek to do business here may 
assign a high degree of risk to any decision that is affected by the current 
law.235 It is unfortunate that Washington, home to e-commerce 
behemoths like Amazon.com and Expedia, continues to facilitate an 
environment that is potentially risky and untested for technology-
forward businesses.236 To this end, the question of whether UETA is a 
perfect law becomes irrelevant—a major benefit of the law is that it is 
uniform and provides a predictable framework for transacting 
business.237 
Second, UETA effectively enables electronic contracting. UETA’s 
broad recognition of electronic signatures and records leaves no room 
for confusion as to whether a particular signature merits legal 
                                                     
232. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a). 
233. See id. §§ 7001(b)(2), 7002(b). 
234. See supra Part V.A. 
235. Hearing on S.B. 6069, supra note 24 (statement of Ken Moyle, Director, Electronic 
Signature and Records Association), available at http://www.tvw.org/index.php?option= 
com_tvwplayer&eventID=2012011130#start=361&stop=1174. 
236. Id. 
237. See Buckley & Selden, supra note 123, at 1 (“For those who are seeking to promote the 
electronic delivery of financial services, availability of national standards is crucial. A patchwork of 
inconsistent state rules for doing business electronically has the potential to hobble the use of 
electronic media.”). 
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recognition: a significant improvement on WEAA, which is potentially 
open to attack on this front. States that have adopted UETA have 
interpreted it liberally to give it effect.238 
Third, early doubts about UETA have largely been answered in the 
ten years since it was issued. When the Washington State Bar 
Association’s Cyberspace Committee last evaluated UETA, it did so 
only months after it had been issued.239 Today, many of the Committee’s 
concerns have been put to rest through the development of case law240 
and the passage of ESIGN, which incorporates many of UETA’s 
provisions.241 
Whatever doubts may still linger about UETA should be balanced 
against its overall benefits. Importantly, adoption of UETA would foster 
uniformity of laws across state lines, and transacting parties could 
benefit from a growing body of nation-wide case law that may serve as 
persuasive authority from one jurisdiction to another. A review of case 
law shows that courts have been adept at interpreting UETA, and their 
decisions provide an additional source of law for parties to interpret their 
contracts.242 This development of case law—even if it may only be 
persuasive authority across jurisdictions—creates a richer, more fully 
tested transacting environment that provides an extra level of 
predictability to contracting parties. 
D.  UETA Is Preferable to a State Version of ESIGN 
In response to recent legislative attempts to adopt UETA in 2012, the 
Washington State Bar Association’s Cyberspace Committee suggested 
that the legislature adopt a state version of ESIGN that would clearly 
                                                     
238. See, e.g., Int’l Casings Group, Inc. v. Premium Standard Farms, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 2d 863 
(W.D. Mo. 2005) (allowing emails to satisfy statute of frauds requirements under UETA); 
Crestwood Shops v. Hilkene, 197 S.W.3d 641, 651 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (ruling that e-mail 
acceptance of offer to terminate lease was enforceable under UETA). 
239. See CYBERSPACE REPORT, supra note 193. 
240. For example, the Cyberspace Committee doubted whether UETA requires parties to execute 
a separate written agreement before contracting electronically. Id. § C(3) (discussing UETA, supra 
note 9, § 5). Courts have inferred that intent from the parties’ use of electronic media. See, e.g., 
Alliance Laundry Sys. LLC v. Thyssenkrupp Materials, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1066 n.3, 1068 (E.D. 
WI 2008); Hilkene, 197 S.W.3d at 651. 
241. See supra Part III.A. 
242. There are dozens of cases interpreting UETA. See, e.g., Waddle v. Elrod, 367 S.W.3d 217, 
228 (Tenn. 2012) (holding that under UETA an attorney’s typed name on the bottom of an email 
satisfied the statute of frauds where the parties manifested intent to finalize settlement negotiations 
through electronic means); Cunningham v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 352 S.W.3d 519, 529 (Tex. App. 
2011) (holding that UETA only applies when parties intend to sign the record using an electronic 
signature); Powell v. City of Newton, 703 S.E.2d 723, 728 (N.C. 2010) (same). 
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apply to intrastate transactions as well as to state and local 
governments.243 This solution is arguably an easy fix for replacing 
Washington’s current statutory schema, and it neatly avoids a 
complicated preemption analysis. 
Although this proposal is certainly an improvement on the current 
state of affairs in Washington, it omits several important provisions of 
UETA, which is the more comprehensive statute of the two.244 UETA, 
unlike ESIGN, contains provisions relating to the attribution of 
electronic signatures,245 the time when messages are deemed to have 
been sent and received,246 mistakes in electronic contracting,247 or the 
parties’ ability to modify UETA by the terms of their agreement.248 For 
example, UETA’s attribution provisions could have provided guidance 
to the appellate court in Neuson, which struggled to weigh the validity of 
an electronic signature that had been created using the employee’s social 
security number, birth date, and zip code.249 These UETA provisions add 
clarity and predictability in navigating potential contract disputes 
because they provide default language where parties may not otherwise 
have contracted for those protections. By providing a more complete 
statutory framework, UETA better enables transacting parties to 
anticipate how a court will resolve potential disputes, thereby reducing 
the need for litigation. 
Additionally, UETA contains more extensive substantive provisions 
to encourage the transferability of records that are notes under UCC 
Article 3 or documents under UCC Article 7.250 In comparison, ESIGN 
                                                     
243. Hearing on S.B. 6069, supra note 24 (statement of Holly Towle, Committee Chair, Law of 
Commerce in Cyberspace Committee), available at http://www.tvw.org/index.php?option= 
com_tvwplayer&eventID=2012011130#start=361&stop=1174. 
244. Patricia Brumfield Fry, Why Enact UETA? The Role of UETA After E-Sign, UNIFORM L. 
COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Docs/Why%20Enact%20UETA.aspx (last 
visited Apr. 29, 2013); see also Charles H. Fendell & Dennis M. Kennedy, Electronic Signatures in 
Missouri: Moving to UETA or Staying with E-SIGN – Winter 2003, THOMPSON COBURN, 
http://www.thompsoncoburn.com/news-and-information/publications/electronic-signatures-in-
missouri.aspx (last visited Apr. 29, 2013) (arguing that the Missouri legislature should adopt UETA 
and discussing the differences between UETA and ESIGN). 
245. UETA, supra note 9, § 9. For a helpful comparison of UETA and ESIGN, see Fry, supra 
note 244. 
246. UETA, supra note 9, § 13. 
247. Id. § 10. 
248. Id. § 9 (referring to the parties’ agreement as a factor in determining the effect of an 
electronic record); id. § 10 (referring to the parties’ agreement to use security procedures). 
249. Neuson v. Macy’s Dep’t Stores Inc., 160 Wash. App. 786, 796, 249 P.3d 1054, 1058 (2011). 
250. UETA, supra note 9, § 16. The UETA Drafting Committee recognized that the law of 
electronic contracting could not easily apply to negotiable instruments, which are writings that 
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only gives legal recognition to transferable records that are notes under 
Article 3 relating to a loan secured by real property.251 At the time that 
UETA and ESIGN were drafted, the technology needed to support the 
integrity of transferable records did not exist, and the difference between 
UETA and ESIGN in this regard was theoretical.252 Today, technology 
has successfully developed to facilitate transferable records,253 making 
UETA’s broader provisions more suited for encouraging the transfer of 
electronic negotiable instruments and documents under UCC Articles 3 
and 7, not just those related to real property. Washington State should 
adopt UETA to benefit from these significant substantive provisions. 
Finally, adopting a state-version of ESIGN would impede uniformity 
across state lines. Washington would once again be an outlier to the 
forty-seven other states that have adopted UETA, and it could 
potentially create uncertainty for parties who are unsure of how a 
contract dispute may be litigated if, for example, there was a question 
regarding the attribution of an electronic signature or the transferability 
of an electronic record. To this end, uniformity can be better achieved 
through the adoption of UETA than through adoption of a state-version 
of ESIGN. Uniformity and predictability, in turn, promote the growth of 
electronic contracting by creating a familiar and tested legal framework 
for transacting business. This should be no small consideration if 
Washington State wants to promote its reputation as a technology and 
business friendly environment. 
CONCLUSION 
Washington’s Electronic Authentication Act is an anachronism that 
creates confusion for parties engaged in both intra- and interstate 
transactions. Instead of maintaining the current status quo, which 
potentially discourages the development of electronic contracting, the 
                                                     
embody intangible rights and obligations. Id. In physical form, they are transferred by endorsement 
and delivery, see, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 3-210, 7-501, but in electronic form, innumerable copies can be 
made which are indistinguishable from one another. Fry, supra note 49, at 246. For more 
information on transferable records as drafted under ESIGN and UETA, see Jane K. Winn, 
Professor of Law, What Is a Transferable Record and Who Cares?, Address Before the Association 
of American Law Schools 2001 Annual Meeting: Section on Law and Computers (Jan. 5, 2001), in 
7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 203 (2001). 
251. 15 U.S.C. § 7021(a)(1) (2006). 
252. Fry, supra note 49, at 269; Winn, supra note 250, at 209–10. 
253. See, e.g., Freddie Mac and Electronic Mortgages: Questions and Answers, FREDDIE MAC, 
http://www.freddiemac.com/singlefamily/elm/elmqa.html#3 (last visited Apr. 4, 2013); 
Transferable Records Management, EORIGINAL, http://www.eoriginal.com/solutions/transferable-
records-management/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2013). 
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Washington legislature should adopt the official version of UETA. 
Adopting UETA provides important statutory protections, brings 
Washington in line with forty-seven other states, and creates a uniform 
environment across state lines. It would be a worthy step towards 
maintaining the vibrancy of Washington’s economy. 
